Firms commonly use supervisor ratings to evaluate employees when objective performance measures are unavailable. Supervisor ratings are subjective and data containing supervisor ratings typically stem from individual firm level data sets. For both these reasons, doubts persist on how useful such data are for evaluating theories in personnel economics and whether findings from such data generalize to the labor force at large. In this paper, we examine personnel data from six large companies and establish how subjective ratings, interpreted as ordinal rankings of employees within narrowly defined peer-groups, correlate with objective career outcomes. We find many similarities across firms in how subjective ratings correlate with earnings, base pay, bonuses, promotions, demotions, separations, quits and dismissals and cautiously propose these as empirical regularities.
1 This project would not have been possible without the exemplary willingness of a number of researchers to share their data. We thank Michael Gibbs for providing access to both the BGH and the GH data, Gerard Pfann for giving access to the Fokker data, and Lucca Flabbi and Andrea Ichino for allowing us to work on the FI data and sharing their code with us. We greatly appreciate the help we have received by all of these in working with and understanding the data. We are also indebted to the two companies referred to in this paper as FT and F for allowing us to work on their data and in particular to the employees in these companies who have made it possible. We are grateful for the comments and discussions we have had with Nikolaj Andreas Halse and Thomas Bech Hansen and members of the CCP network. Michael Lykke Jensen has provided competent research assistance on this project.
Introduction
How firms motivate and select employees when facing limited information about their actions and characteristics is the central issue in personnel economics. In some settings, firms rely on objective measures of employee performance to form personnel policies and improve corporate performance. 2 However, objective measures are generally not available when workers perform many different tasks in frequently changing environments, when they work in teams or when their actions affect the value of the firm over both the short and long run. In such contexts, supervisors often subjectively evaluate workers' performances. These subjective evaluations are presumably an important tool in creating incentives and screening workers. Unfortunately, empirical research on subjective performance measures is thin, which leads Oyer and Schaefer (2010, p. 11 ) to conclude that: -there is a great need for more empirical research on the use of implicit contracts and subjective performance evaluation in employment relationships.‖ A major obstacle in studying the use and consequences of subjective performance ratings is, of course, their subjectivity. Subjective evaluations can be influenced not just by the performance of the worker, but also by the characteristics of the supervisor and by the relationship between the supervisor and the employee. Furthermore, subjective measures are reported on arbitrary metrics. Therefore, abstract concepts such as effort and ability-concepts common in models of moral hazard and adverse selection-may map onto performance ratings in widely varying ways across firms and circumstances. All this makes it difficult to evaluate the standard models in personnel economics using subjective performance ratings. The question arises, whether individual firm data sets containing subjective performance evaluations can be used to test theory and if the empirical results can be generalized. The answer to this question, in part, hinges on whether or not there are empirical regularities across firms in how subjective performance ratings co-move with objective career outcome. 2 Over the last decades, a number of studies have examined the use of objective performance measures. In the most famous of these studies, Lazear (2000) explored how Safelite, a windshield repair-company, used the number of windshields replaced as a measure of performance for its repairmen. This landmark paper showed how a change in the incentive system affected both the sorting and selection of workers and their performance on the job. Other objective performance measures that have been investigated are the number of trees planted (Shearer 2004) ) and the amount of fruit picked (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2005, 2007) . These studies considered how objective performance varies with the pay system. A burgeoning literature in education economics uses value-added measures of student test scores to examine issues in selecting and creating incentives for teachers (Barlevy and Neal 2011; Goldhaber and Hansen 2010). 3 In this paper we study personnel data sets from six firms. 3 These data sets cover all data sets in the literature that contain subjective performance evaluation of which we are aware and that we could gain access to. 4 In isolation, each of these data sets has been studied by us or by other researchers before, but typically the focus was not on performance evaluations. Our main goal is to establish regularities across firm data sets in how subjective performance measures are related to a wide set of career outcomes, including wages, bonus pay, total compensation, demotions, promotions, and separations (sometimes distinguished by dismissals and quits).
The first part of our analysis focuses on how performance ratings on average change with experience -a question that was first taken up by Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) . In our data, we find that performance ratings increase with experience (within job level) in some firms, decrease in some others, and are non-monotone in still others. Medoff and Abraham found that subjective performance ratings within job levels declined with experience. Medoff and Abraham also found, as do we, that earnings gradients with experience are robust to controlling for performance ratings.
How to interpret these findings depends on whether performance ratings are assumed to be comparable across experience levels or whether they are assumed to be ordinal comparisons (-rankings‖) of employees within a more narrow peer-group defined, for instance, by the experience level. While Medoff and Abraham favored the first interpretation we favor the second. The main reason is the differences in the performance-experience gradients that we observe across firms. Our interpretation attributes these differences to differences in the way performance scales are used at different experience levels in the various firms. Once we allow performance measures to contain -noise‖ our interpretation also accommodates the finding that experience profiles in log earnings regressions are robust to the inclusion of performance ratings. Thus, our interpretation of performance ratings, which accommodates our empirical findings, is that they reflect ordinal 3 The most prominent dataset we use is the one analyzed by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström (1993, 1994a,b) . These articles inspired important theoretical contributions in personnel economics (e.g., Gibbons and Waldman, 1999, 2006) . More recent studies based on this data are Kahn and Lange (2011) and DeVaro and Waldman (2011) . We also use data from Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) who examined the role of formal salary systems. While these two datasets are from the United States the remaining datasets are from Europe. Flabbi and Ichino (2001) used data from a large Italian bank to replicate and expand on the analysis of Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) . Dohmen (2004) and Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann (2004) analyzed the personnel records from Fokker, a now defunct Dutch aircraft manufacturer. Frederiksen and Takáts (2011) used data from a large European pharmaceutical company to study the mix and hierarchy of incentives. These data do not include subjective performance evaluations, but for our analysis, we obtained a second wave that included supervisor ratings. The last of our data sets was used by Frederiksen (2010) to analyze explicit and implicit incentives in a large service sector firm. 4 Most notably, the data used in Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) is unfortunately not accessible.
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measures of employee performance within narrowly defined peer groups (defined by experience, demographics and education).
A number of patterns in the data are sufficiently consistent across firms that we cautiously propose that these are general empirical regularities.
Regarding the distribution of performance ratings, we find that:
1. Performance scales tend to be very restricted. With only one exception the companies use either a five or a six point scale. The effective scale is restricted further because supervisors are reluctant to give bad ratings; there is clearly a -Lake Wobegon‖ effect in which everyone is above average. Typically, more than 95 percent of ratings are concentrated on
only three values at the upper end of the ranking scale.
2. Experience and tenure fail to explain much of the variation in performance evaluations.
Instead, job levels explain a fairly large component of the variation in performance ratings.
3. We find, without exception, that the idiosyncratic components of performance ratings that individuals receive are highly correlated at short lags. At one lag, the autocorrelations almost always exceed 0.4, typically exceed 0.6, and sometimes exceed 0.8. The autocorrelations decline with longer lags and tend to be between 0.1 and 0.4 after three or four lags. The autocorrelations in performance evaluations are also found to be higher for more experienced workers.
Using the panel nature of the data, we can evaluate how pay components correlated with past, current, and future performance ratings. Even though there is some variation in these correlation patterns across firms, we do find a number of regularities:
4. In all our firms, performance evaluations are positively correlated with log total compensation, with log base pay and with log bonuses. 5 We also find that the correlations of performance evaluations with base pay, with bonuses, and with total compensation increase with experience.
5 Throughout the remainder of the paper we will refer to logarithms when using terms such as -base pay‖,
-bonuses‖ and -total compensation‖. 5 5. Base pay and total compensation tend to correlate more highly with contemporaneous and past performance evaluations than with future performance evaluations. This finding is present among younger and older employees.
6. Bonuses tend to correlate more highly with current than with past and future performance evaluations. These finding could reflect that these firms tie bonuses directly to current performance. In other firms, however, there is little difference in how bonuses correlate with current, past, or future performance ratings.
Performance ratings also influence how employees move internally and out of the firm.
7. In all firms, promotions correlate positively and demotions negatively with performance.
8. Transitions out of the firm are negatively correlated with performance. In the two firms where we can distinguish dismissals from quits we find that both are negatively correlated with performance ratings, and that the correlation between performance and dismissals is larger.
Our analysis of the six firm-level data sets proceeds as follows. We introduce the firms and present descriptive statistics on subjective performance evaluations in the next section. Section 3 is inspired by the work of Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) and considers how subjective performance ratings vary with experience and tenure. In this section, we also take a stand on how to interpret subjective performance evaluations. In Sections 4 and 5, we analyze the autocorrelation patterns of performance and pay separately. In Section 6, we establish how total compensation as well as its components -base pay and bonuses -are related to performance ratings. Sections 7 and 8 address the importance of subjective performance evaluations for employee mobility both internally (promotions and demotions) and exit from the firm (separations, quits and dismissals).
The Firms
We analyze personnel data from six large and very diverse companies. The data from these companies has been analyzed by us or by other researcher before, even though typically the focus of the prior studies has not been on performance evaluations. In this Section, we introduce these companies and briefly summarize the research on these data that precedes this study. We also present summary statistics on these data, paying particular attention to the performance evaluations.
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With the exception of Fokker, we are not allowed to reveal the identities of the firms in our study.
We will therefore use the names of the research teams that first analyzed these data to identify the different companies. We will thus refer to the companies as Baker-Gibbs-Holmstrom (BGH), 
Fokker

(Aircraft manufacturer)
Industry Unknown
Gibbs-Hendricks (GH) (Service workers) 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 The six companies are located in different countries, they operate in different industries and our data covers different time-periods. Figure 1 We know turn to present the firms in more detail and to briefly summarize the prior research that has been conducted on these data.
Baker-Gibbs-Holmstrom (BGH)
In two ground-breaking papers, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b) analyzed the personnel data of a U.S. based service-sector firm. The study focused on managerial employees (about 20 percent of the workforce) and covered a period when the firm experienced rapid growth in assets and employees. The authors described the internal personnel structure in detail, and looked for the existence of an -internal labor market.‖ They also considered in an informal way whether the findings were consistent with models of employer learning, human capital acquisition, and simple provision of incentives. In summarizing the findings of BGH, Gibbs (1995) writes that BGH -concluded that their evidence was inconsistent with simple models of learning and incentives.
Instead, they suggested that many of their findings were consistent with a model in which employees accumulate human capital at varying rates.‖ BGH did not analyze the use of subjective performance ratings in this firm. That was first attempted by Gibbs (1995) . He showed that performance ratings correlated strongly with pay, pay rises, and promotions, but they did not predict exit from the firm. Similar to BGH and based on the same data, Kahn and Lange (2011) reestablished that heterogeneous human capital accumulation is important, but by using the information conveyed in the subjective ratings they also provided evidence that employer learning was taking place at all stages of the employees' careers. That is, employers were trying to -hit a moving target.‖ Our analysis replicates the results in Gibbs (1995) , but it also goes beyond his analysis by focusing more on dynamic aspects. Further, the dynamic analysis presented in Section 6 is designed to test whether the core results established in Kahn and Lange (2011) This, as well as the demographics and the high education levels of staff, reflects the focus on managerial employees in this data set.
Gibbs-Hendricks (GH)
Our description of GH is based on Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) . The data cover white-collar professional and managerial employees as well as clerical and technical office workers employed in a large U.S. corporation active in several different businesses. The industry is unknown to us. The data, which includes tenure as well as data on compensation, promotions, and demotions spans 1989 to 1993.
Interestingly, GH contains information on the administrative pay system used to set pay (Grade, Hay, and PAQ, as described in GH). Gibbs and Hendricks (2004, p. 75) found that no raises often indicated individuals who were bumping up against the top of their salary ranges. However, they also found that supervisors seemed to be using bonuses to partially alleviate these constraints. These constraints could also be avoided by promoting workers to higher salary ranges. Overall, they argued that the firm did not incur large costs from the nominal constraints imposed by the formal salary rules. This is consistent with the view that the ability to assign employees to different salary ranges jobs combined with the use bonuses and some discretion in pay suffices to accommodate market forces.
GH draws on 43,964 employee-year observations from a total of 14,372 unique employees, all of whom have less than 40 years of experience. Employees' average compensation of $58,000 exceeds the U.S. average. The data contains indicators for promotions and demotions but we cannot distinguish between those in management positions and those not. The performance ratings in this firm were tied to compensation according to a very strict system of rules and regulations. As we show below, these rules are reflected in the correlation patterns between compensation and performance ratings, particularly among blue-collar workers. For a more detailed description of this data, see Dohmen (2004) and Dohmen et al. (2004) .
Flabbi -Ichino (FI)
The company analyzed by Flabbi and Ichino is a large bank operating throughout Italy. Flabbi and Ichino (2001) replicated the analysis by Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) . We follow Flabbi and
Ichino's methods in most aspects when constructing the data set. Over a period of six years from 1990 to 1995, 12,996 unique employees were counted, with a total of 63,390 employee-year 10 observations. Subjective performance evaluations are available only for nonmanagerial workers. As do Flabbi and Ichino, we restrict the sample to males. Reflecting the lower incomes in Italy and the restriction to nonmanagerial employees, average earnings are amount to only about $29,000.
Fredriksen -Takáts (FT)
The company that FT analyzed is a global pharmaceutical company headquartered in Europe but with production and sales activities on all continents. Frederiksen and Takáts (2011) study the firm's use of incentives and derive a hierarchy of incentives. In particular, they explain why firms often use a complex mix of incentives. That is, in the FT model, firms concerned about employee quality may find it optimal to combine cost-effective incentives such as promotions and bonuses with dismissals. The reason is that even though dismissals are costly, they (like promotions) both provide incentives and contribute to the sorting and selection of employees. Subsequently,
Frederisken and Takáts used the model to predict the consequences of promotions and dismissals for the employees' careers and used the FT data to provide support for these predictions.
The data available for analysis contains employees working in the country where the company's headquarter is located and besides these corporate activities they include employees in production, information-technology, and research and development. The data used in the analysis span 2007 to 2011 and thus constitute the most recent data among the six data sets.
The use of a systematic and companywide performance appraisal system is relatively new to the FT firm, and the sample period overlaps with the phasing-in of the performance measurement system.
Consequently, only a fraction of employees received performance ratings in the early years.
However, by the end of the sample period, more than two-thirds of employees received a rating.
The FT data contain all relevant information on compensation and employee mobility, and a unique feature of the data is that we can identify separations as either quits or dismissals. A total of 64,976 employee-year observations are available for analysis, and these are based on information from 17,933 unique individuals. The wage level in this firm was $46,000.
Frederiksen (F)
The F firm is a service sector firm that Frederiksen (2010) analyzed for implicit and explicit incentives. Using a dynamic moral hazard model, Frederiksen predicted cross-sectional and individual earnings dynamics and the mechanisms leading to earnings growth. The overall conclusion was that the model performed well in explaining early career earnings dynamics. In 11 particular, he documents that earnings growth heterogeneity was significant among newly recruited employees and that this heterogeneity to a large extent was driven by differences in performance ratings.
The F firm has some international activities but our data cover only domestic operations. The data comprises more than 20,000 unique employees and a total of 89,508 employee-year observations between 2004 and 2009. Average earnings in the firm are close to $50,000. The data contain all relevant information on performance, compensation, and mobility. Separations can be distinguished as quits and dismissals. With the exception of GH, the scale of the performance measures and their distributions are very similar. Most common is a five-point scale, with 1 corresponding to a low rating and 5 to a high rating. There are, however, other scales as well. For instance, Fokker applied a five-point scale for its white-collar workers and a six-point scale for its blue-collar workers. The only firm applying a substantially different scale is GH, which uses an 18-point scale. High 6 Na 6 1.48 Na 44.97 Na Na 1 GH applies a 1-18 point scale but six levels account for 93 percent of the ratings. For GH, only the rates pertaining to the six most common ratings are included.
In all firms, performance ratings are concentrated on a subset of the scale. The concentration is most extreme for Fokker white-collar workers, where one category accounts for 81 percent of the ratings.
For the other firms, typically all but 3 percent to 4 percent of ratings are concentrated in only three categories. From the distributions, it is clear that managers are very reluctant to give employees low ratings as these are rarely used.
The clear majority of employees is subject to performance appraisals each year. In some cases, however, an employee subgroup is exempted from evaluations. For instance, in FT, systematic 14 performance evaluation is relatively new, and during the phase-in period, the company exempted various employee subgroups from the evaluation program. In other companies, newly recruited employees are unlikely to have performance evaluations. For example, in F, employees do not receive ratings in their first year of employment. It is likely that similar rules are in place in other firms. In any case, the incidence of performance evaluations is not uniform and varies for reasons that are not well understood. 10 In what follows, we treat the incidence of evaluation as exogenous.
Performance Ratings over the Lifecycle: Medoff and Abraham Revisited
We begin our analysis of subjective performance ratings by investigating how they are related to experience and tenure. In two well-known papers, Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) used personnel records containing subjective performance ratings from three different firms to answer the challenge raised by Mincer (1974, p. 11) of whether it can be -shown that growth of earnings under seniority provisions is largely independent of productivity growth.‖ In their data, performance measures decline with experience, holding grade level constant. In addition, controlling for performance ratings did not attenuate the observed earnings-experience gradient. 11 Thus, because they interpreted the subjective performance measures as cardinal measures of productivity, they concluded that -the primary finding … appears to be at odds with what would be expected, given the human capital interpretation of the experience-earnings profile‖ (p. 704).
In Tables 3, 4 , and 5, we provide evidence on the same question. Table 3 shows that there is no consistent pattern across firms in how mean performance ratings vary with experience, age, and tenure. Performance ratings increase with age, tenure, and experience in FI, they follow an inverted u-shape in GH, FT and F, and they decline in BGH. Within Fokker, performance ratings increase for blue-collar workers whereas among white-collar workers, they are almost perfectly flat. 10 Halse et. al. (2011) study the use of performance measures in a global company and discuss why performance evaluations may differ in terms of quality and prevalence across countries. 11 Using the omitted variable bias formula, it should be clear that both of these findings are directly related in that controlling for performance ratings will attenuate the earnings-experience gradient if (a) performance ratings correlate positively with experience and (b) performance ratings correlate positively with wages. Medoff and Abraham (1981) . That is, we regress performance ratings on a polynomial in experience, a polynomial in tenure, and controls.
Among the controls are year and education dummies, gender, age, and race when appropriate. We orthogonalize tenure using experience and the other controls so that the experience coefficients include any effect that operates through tenure. The tenure coefficients can be interpreted as -within experience‖ effects of tenure.
As in Table 3 , we find that the performance-experience profiles are not stable across firms. At the average level of experience, performance ratings decline for BGH, FT, and F, and they increase for GH, blue-collar Fokker, and FI. The shapes of the quadratic polynomials are more regular; in all firms except BGH and white-collar Fokker the shapes of the quadratic experience and tenure profiles are concave. This implies that performance ratings increase more rapidly among newly hired workers and/or young workers.
We generally find that job-level indicators explain significant fractions of the variation in performance. In BGH, FI, FT, and F, job-level indicators nearly double the R-square. In addition, the estimated performance gradients in experience and tenure are typically quite sensitive to controlling for job levels. In FI, F, and FT, controlling for job levels attenuates the effect of experience on performance ratings by one-third to more than one-half.
It should be noted, however, that in these performance regressions, R-squares are generally low and the standard errors of the regressions are large, indicating substantial variation in performance that does not correlate with either experience or tenure. One explanation is that the performance ratings are noisy measures of actual productivity. Note: Experience refers to potential experience defined as: Age minus 6 minus years of schooling. In each column, we residualize tenure and tenure-squared using all other controls appearing in that regression. Each regression controls for education in a flexible manner, where the exact education controls depend on the data set used. In addition to education all regressions control for gender and year as well as race dummies when appropriate. 1) In BGH, tenure is not available for those already in the firm in 1969. We substituted a value of 0 for the orthogonalized tenure measure for those with missing tenure.
2) GH does not have data on the hierarchical structure of the firm.
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In Table 5 , we present log earnings regression analogous to Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) .
Medoff and Abraham examined whether log earnings gradients in experience and tenure attenuate when performance ratings are included among the controls. 12 Flabbi and Ichino (2001) replicated these regressions for the FI firm. We consider the same specification for log earnings used in those papers. As do Abraham and Medoff (and FI), we find only weak evidence that controlling for performance evaluations reduces the magnitude of the experience and tenure effects on earnings.
Following the interpretation of Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) that performance ratings can be used to compare performances across individuals at different experience levels, one would be forced to conclude that earnings do not reflect worker productivity. We prefer a different interpretation of the performance measures.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 show that experience and tenure profiles in performance ratings vary considerably across companies even when controlling for job levels. In addition, the results in Table   5 show that experience profiles in log earnings regressions are not sensitive to including performance ratings. Following Medoff and Abraham (1980) , these results would implausibly imply very large differences across firms in how worker productivity evolves with experience and that earnings are unaffected by performance. We believe that the results are better explained if performance ratings are interpreted as noisy measures of relative performance within narrowly defined peer groups-where the peer group is defined by demographics, education, and experience.
This interpretation attributes the large difference in the performance-experience gradients across firms to differences in the use of the performance scales at different experience levels across firms.
It also accommodates the finding that experience profiles in log earnings regressions are robust to the inclusion of performance ratings.
The next step in our analysis is to examine the data for consistent patterns in the joint distributions of performance ratings and career outcomes. We begin with autocorrelation patterns in performance ratings (Section 4) and then investigate in detail how performance ratings and career outcomes correlate. Experience refers to potential experience defined as: Age minus 6 minus years of schooling. In each column, we residualize tenure and tenure-squared using all other controls appearing in that regression. Each regression controls for education in a flexible manner, where the exact education controls depend on the data set used. In addition to education, all regressions control for gender and year as well as race dummies when appropriate. 1) BGH uses only the years 1981-1988 where full information on log compensation is available. 2) GH does not have information on job levels. The regression with performance ratings includes dummies for all performance ratings available in GH. Reported are the effects for the six ratings reported in Table 1 . 
Correlation Patterns in Performance Ratings
In this section, we consider the second moments of performance ratings. Subjective ratings are reported on ordinal scales that are necessarily without units. Consequently, the variance of performance ratings does not contain useful information. Our discussion of the second moments therefore concentrates on correlations across time.
In the previous section, we argued that ratings should be interpreted as the employee's relative performance within a peer group. We assume that an employee's peer group in a given year consists of coworkers with the same gender, race, education, and experience. Thus, we use the residuals obtained from regressing performance on detailed experience and year dummies, gender, education, race, and interactions of experience as well as the linear time trend with gender, education, and race. Figure 2 , panels A-G, show how (residualized) performance ratings correlate for up to six lags.
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For each firm, we show the correlations for younger workers (years of experience 1-15) and older workers (years of experience 16-30). These correlations are calculated using the unbalanced panels generated by the personnel data sets, and they are averages across individuals within each of the two experience levels.
These autocorrelations display many robust similarities across companies. To begin, the first-order autocorrelations tend to be high in all six data-sets. They lie between 0.35 and 0.90 for more experienced workers and between 0.35 and 0.70 for younger workers. For all firms and all lags (except for one distant correlation in FT), the correlations are higher among the more experienced workers. The age differences in these correlations are relatively small in BGH, GH, FT, and F.
Looking across lags, we find (with one exception for the sixth autocorrelation among young whitecollar employees in Fokker) that all the correlations are positive. Typically they decay to about 0.2 to 0.3 for the higher-order autocorrelations, but among more experienced blue-collar workers in Fokker and among the more experienced employees in FI, the autocorrelations remain quite high.
Overall, we find that the autocorrelation patterns in ratings are very similar across all firms, both in the United States and Europe, blue collar and white collar , and regardless when between 1969 to 2010 they were collected. 
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Correlations Patterns in Compensation Growth
We next consider how growth in various compensation measures correlates across different lags. In their seminal papers, BGH (1994 a, b) shows that some workers experience consistently faster earnings growth and move more rapidly through the ranks of the firm; they seem to be proceeding as if along a -fast-track.‖ We revisit this question here -both for total compensation and, where possible, base pay and bonuses separately.
We residualize the compensation measures using the same specification we used for the performance measures. 14 Table 6 shows how the growth in a given residualized compensation measure between t-1 and t correlates with growth in the same measure between t-k-1 and t-k for k=1,..,5.
The autocorrelation patterns in log total compensation growth vary considerably across companies.
In BGH, we see only weak autocorrelations. In other firms, the correlations are negative (GH, FI and F), positive (Fokker), and mixed (FT). A clear tendency, however, is that correlations become weaker with distance.
14 We use log(bonus+1) if bonus is zero. Note: We show correlations in growth for the various residualized compensation measures across up to five lags. These are pair-wise correlations and therefore the number of observations going into each cell is not common across rows within columns. We show correlations from the 1981-1988 period for BGH, because this is the period for which we have base-pay and bonus information. Autocorrelation patterns in base pay and bonus payments are very different. In all firms, the first autocorrelation in log bonus growth is strongly negative, which suggests that periods of high bonus growth are followed by periods of low growth. The evidence on the autocorrelations in log base pay growth is more mixed. For two firms (FI and F), we find negative autocorrelations in log base pay growth. For GH, autocorrelations are mixed. For the remaining firms, log base pay growth is positively autocorrelated. The mixed findings on the autocorrelation structures presented in this section show that the earnings process is to a large degree firm specific. In addition, when variable pay components such as bonuses are part of the compensation package, the dynamics of base pay and total compensation may be very different.
Correlations of Performance Ratings with Earnings Components
In this section, we consider how earnings and performance ratings are correlated. We consider total compensation and, to the extent possible, we look separately at bonus pay and base pay. We do not simply consider the contemporaneous correlations, but also consider how earnings and performance ratings correlate when they are separated by various leads and lags.
To remain consistent, we residualize performance and the three log earnings measures in the same manner we did in Sections 4 and 5. For all earnings measures, we consider the correlation of the earning measure at experience t with performance ratings obtained in period t+k, where k is allowed to vary between (at most) -5 and +5. We obtain these correlations for two groups: individuals with 0-15 years of experience and individuals with 16-30 years of experience. 
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In Figure 3A -E, we show the correlations between performance and base pay for the five data sets where we can break down total compensation into base pay and bonuses. A consistent finding across firms, and in particular for more experienced workers, is that the correlations of base pay with contemporaneous ratings or ratings obtained in the near past exceed the correlations of base pay with future performance ratings. Kahn and Lange (2011) first noticed this discontinuity in the correlation patterns around the present time in their analysis of the BGH data. Here, we find the same asymmetry in GH, FT and F and among older workers for FI.
Kahn and Lange also emphasize that in BGH, the correlations of log base pay with performance ratings are higher for older workers than they are for younger workers. We find the same patterns in the other firms (with a few exceptions for GH and FT). A final finding common to all data sets that is not easily explained within the Kahn-Lange framework is that base pay correlates less with performance ratings obtained far in the future than with those obtained in the immediate future. We next turn to the correlations between performance ratings and log bonuses (see Figures 4A-E) .
The observed patterns are quite different from those established for base pay. In GH, we find no discernible pattern, regardless of the age of the workers. In FT, and F, performance pay and bonuses are highly correlated with current ratings. This pattern is less pronounced but still discernible in BGH and FI. Only in GH is there no evidence that contemporaneous performance and bonuses are more highly correlated than bonuses and performance in other periods. Overall, the findings provide some support for the hypothesis that bonuses are being used to provide direct incentives. firms where we could separately study base pay and bonuses, we find that the correlations between total compensation and performance mirror those for base pay and performance. In Fokker, where this distinction was not possible, we find large differences between blue-collar and white-collar workers. Although the patterns for white-collar workers are in line with what we observe in other firms, the correlations for blue-collar workers are unusual. For them, past performance measures correlate less highly with current compensation than do future performance measures. These results are exceptional and can be in part be explained by the very strict administrative rules governing pay, as described in Dohmen (2004) .
The results presented in this section show some common patterns. First, there is a clear tendency toward higher correlations between earnings and performance ratings for older rather than younger workers. For instance, we find that contemporaneous correlations between log total compensation and performance ratings are high and between 0.15 and 0.40 for more-experienced workers and relatively low and between 0.10 and 0.30 for less-experienced workers. Second, similar to Kahn and Lange for BGH, we find a step pattern in the correlations of total compensation and base pay across leading and lagging performance ratings in many, but not, all firms. In particular, for older workers, correlations of log total compensation or log base pay with performance measures two or three periods into the past can be 0.05 points higher than the correlations two or three periods into the future. Finally, the step patterns in the correlations of total compensation and base pay with performance are not evident for bonuses. However, bonuses tend to be more highly correlated with current performance, which would be expected if firms tie bonuses directly to current performance. 
Correlations of Performance Ratings with Promotions and Demotions
We next analyze internal employee mobility, specifically, the frequency of promotions and demotions and their relation to performance ratings. Our focus is on yearly transition rates. That is, we compare job levels at time t and t+1, where the two periods are separated by one year, for individuals who are employed by the firm in two consecutive years. When controlling for performance and individual characteristics, we always use information from time t. Table 7 present statistics on the frequency of promotions and demotions in the different firms. 15 The data in the first three rows describe promotion and demotion for all individuals in the firm. The promotions frequencies vary substantially across firms and range from 2.4 percent to 16 percent.
Demotions are less frequent but not uncommon. The ratio of promotions to demotions is between 3 and 80, but three firms have ratios below 4.6.
In Table 7 (lower part), we show the time to first promotion. We restrict the sample to individuals who are both recruited and who stay with the firm for at least six consecutive years within the sample period. Again, there is a lot of variation across firms. Almost 80 percent of employees in BGH, but only 14 percent of blue-collar workers at Fokker, are promoted within the first five years.
For the other firms, the probability of being promoted during the first five years varies between 45 percent and 65 percent. Conditional on being promoted within the first five years, promotions are typically much more common within the first two or three years. The main exception is FI, where a very large fraction of employees is promoted during the fifth year of employment. 16 Thus, we find that in most firms, a substantial fraction of new employees are promoted relatively soon after they are recruited. However, it is also noteworthy that a large fraction is passed over for promotion in the first five years of employment and this group may never receive a promotion. 15 We use job levels to construct promotions and demotions in BGH, Fokker, FI, FT, and F. Job levels in BGH are those generated by BGH (1994a,b) . We chose these level classifications in part to generate common -career trajectories‖ along a job hierarchy within a firm. It is likely that this classification scheme leads us to underestimate demotions. Promotions and demotions in Fokker, FI, FT, and F are based on job levels defined by the respective firms. GH provides direct measures of promotions and demotions. 16 In general, we find that many patterns in FI point to a system that seems highly regulated and with little individual variation. The large heaping of promotions at particular points in individual careers as well as the lack of demotions and separations (see below) all point to a system that bases promotions and demotions on rules common to all workers. Because of the Italian context, it likely reflects union-based contractual rules agreed. Note: To construct the -time to first promotion,‖ we sample those individuals who are both recruited and stay with the firm for six consecutive years within the sample period. The sample period for FT is five years and we can therefore only we consider time to promotion within the first four years for this company. Among blue-collar workers in Fokker, we very rarely observe promotions to white-collar jobs. Somewhat more often, but still rare, are demotions of white-collar workers to the blue-collar jobs.
Overall, it is difficult to explain the observed differences in the frequency of promotions and demotions as they in part may reflect differences in administrative and reporting practices across firms. 17 Nevertheless, two findings are consistent across firms: there are many more promotions than demotions, and there are more promotions among recent hires.
High performance ratings are associated with an increased promotion probability. In Table 9 , we explore the relation between performance and promotions further and present odds ratios from regressions relating promotions to the performance of employees (relative to their job level) during the last two periods. In all firms, an increase in recent performance significantly raises the odds of a promotion. In GH, Fokker, FI, FT, and F, an increase in performance today raises the promotion probability by between 20 and 134 percent. An even stronger relation is observed in BGH, where the odds ratio is 3.69. Lagged performance is in general less important for promotion.
In BGH, FI, and Fokker, a test for the odds-ratio being 1 cannot be rejected. In GH, lagged performance has a negative effect on the promotion probability, whereas in FT and F, the effect is positive. The table reports odds ratios of logistic regressions of promotion between t and t+1 on residualized performance from time t and t-1. All regressions control for quadratics in experience and orthogonal tenure, together with education, gender, and year dummies, and race when appropriate. Each specification furthermore includes dummy variables for the job levels in t and t-1.
Correlations of Performance Ratings with Separations, Quits, and Dismissals
Here we examine the correlations between employee turnover and performance. Although most research on employee turnover is restricted to addressing job separations (when an employee leaves a company), two of the firms have provided information on the reason for job separation. This allows us to examine the relation between performance and, respectively, quits (employee initiated separation) and dismissals (employer initiated separation).
In Table 10 we present job separation probabilities for the six firms. The separation rates in the American firms (10.7 percent and 12.5 percent) exceed those in the European firms. The lowest separation rates are in the Italian firm, FI, with just over 2.2 percent. Excepting the period of downsizing that Fokker underwent after 1992, separation rates in the other European firms range from 5.9 to 7.5 percent. The separation rates in these companies thus line up with the stereotypical view that European labor markets are characterized by less mobility than the U.S. labor market, and in particular the perception that there is very little labor mobility in Italy. For FT and F, we examine the distinction between quits and dismissals. In both of these firms, the majority of separations are classified as quits. Dismissals are more frequent in FT, where they occur at a rate of 1.7 percent annually. On average, only 0.6 percent of workers at F are dismissed each year. Table 10 also shows that the correlation between separations and job performance is uniformly negative. The correlations are particularly strong in BGH, GH, and FT and very weak in FI. In FT and F, where it is possible to disentangle quits from dismissals, both types of exits are negatively correlated with performance, but the correlation between performance and dismissals is stronger.
The relation between performance and separations is explored in more detail in Table 11 . We use the same specification as in Table 9 and establish the result that higher performance implies a lower separation probability. A test for the odds ratio for lagged performance being 1 cannot be rejected in most firms. Only in F and Fokker (blue-collar only) does lagged performance reduce the exit rate. Separation between t and t+1 is regressed on residualized performance from time t and t-1. All regressions control for quadratics in experience and orthogonal tenure, gender, and year dummies, and race when appropriate. Each specification furthermore includes dummy variables for the job levels in t and t-1.
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Conclusion
In most employment relationships, objective performance measures are unavailable. For this reason, supervisors are often asked to subjectively evaluate workers' performances. In turn, the subjective performance ratings become part of the information employers use when they sort, select, and create incentives for their employees. Because personnel data including performance ratings are still rare, very little is known about how these ratings are used and what consequence they have for employees' careers. The purpose of this paper has been to uncover any empirical regularities in the use of performance ratings across firms. We hope it will provide an empirical basis that can be used to evaluate, test, and modify theories of employment relationships.
Across six companies, we find many similarities in the way performance scales are structured and used and in how performance ratings correlate with pay and other career outcomes. For instance, the correlation between total compensation and contemporaneous performance never exceeds 0.4, is typically above 0.2, and is generally higher for more-experienced workers. Less robust, but still notable, is our finding that, in many firms, base pay and total compensation correlate more highly with past performance ratings than future performance ratings. We also find many similarities in how performance and employee mobility is related. For example, promotions are always positively correlated with recent performance, whereas demotions and transitions out of the firm are negatively correlated with performance.
There are a number of exceptions and idiosyncrasies that likely stem from the specific circumstances of the studied firms. For instance, among blue-collar workers in Fokker, compensation tends to be more highly correlated with future rather than past performance measures.
We believe this is an artifact of a set of very stringent rules negotiated with the unions, as described in Dohmen (2004) and Dohmen et al. (2004) . Nevertheless, the similarities across firms in their use of performance ratings far outweigh the exceptions.
Past research has raised the concern that the information in subjective performance measures may be limited because of collusion (Tirole 1986) , influence costs (Milgrom 1988) , bias (Prendergast and Topel 1993; MacLeod 2003) , and favoritism (Prendergast and Topel 1996) . Although these concerns are certainly valid, our empirical findings show that performance ratings correlate significantly with career outcomes, and that these correlations to a large extent are similar across
